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Abstract 
Delegation decisions comprise a key component of investment 
governance structures of firms. Based on agency theory, this paper explores 
corporate governance and market dynamics as antecedents of investment 
management delegation by insurance firms in Kenya. Investment governance 
structures employed by firms are shaped by their unique circumstances and 
diverse considerations. The objectives of this research were to establish the 
influence of corporate governance and market dynamics on the investment 
governance structures of insurance firms in Kenya. The study adopted a 
descriptive approach with a target population of forty six firms in insurance 
and reinsurance business in Kenya. Both primary data and secondary data 
were collected. Data analysis was conducted using STATA relying on a binary 
logistic regression model. The study found that shareholder control, board 
diversity and avoidance of agency problems leads firms towards delegating 
their investment management activities. Desire to access alternative assets, 
peer influences and asset allocation considerations had a lesser extent of 
influence on firms towards delegation. The study concludes that large 
shareholder dictations and lack of investment management expertise in boards 
causes firms to adopt delegation models in their investment management. On 
the other hand, easy access to investment markets and constant supply of high 
yielding government bonds pulls firms towards internal investment 
management. It is recommended that firms make appropriate choices on extent 
of delegation by carefully evaluating their needs and developing structures that 
deliver best outcomes. 
Keywords: Human- Investment management, delegation, agency theory, 
corporate governance, investment markets 
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Introduction 
 The investment governance structures adopted by an institutional 
investor have implications in investment decision making and the overall 
investment strategy of the investor. Drew and Walk (2019) define investment 
governance as the effective use of resources by a fiduciary or agent seeking to 
fulfill a fiduciary duty to a principal (or beneficiary). Useem and Mitchell 
(2000) described investor governance as the structure of an investor’s board, 
together with the complex of rules and practices that guide its oversight over 
the fund assets. Investment governance guides the overall investment 
management framework. Gordon, Sharpe and Bailey (2001) describe 
investment management as the process of managing money which may be 
passive or active, use explicit or implicit procedures and have risk level that is 
controlled or uncontrolled. It is the art and science of analyzing, selecting, 
maintaining and evaluating the performance of a collection of securities with 
the objective of achieving set investment goals.  
 Drew and Walk (2019) posit that investment governance of an investor 
may be dictated by legal and regulatory requirements or it may be a 
discretionary decision of the investor. In all cases, there are certain decision 
antecedents that must be put into consideration when making this decision. 
Hodgson et al. (2000) argue when deciding on their investment governance 
structures investors generally face both financial and non-financial 
constraints. Financial constraints include fund size, investment manager fees, 
target returns and risk appetite. Non- financial factors may be implicit costs 
such as investor's time available to manage the investment arrangements, 
accountability needs as a fiduciary or legislative requirements. There is no 
regulatory framework governing the investment governance of insurance 
companies in Kenya thereby leaving the decision at the discretion of the 
individual firms.  
 As institutional investors, insurance companies occupy a high place in 
terms of their Assets under Management (AUM). While accurate up to date 
global insurance statistics are difficult to obtain, available data shows that the 
insurance industry investment portfolios doubled from US $ 10.4 trillion in 
2000 accounting for 45.6% of global GDP to US $ 20 trillion accounting for 
57.7% of global GDP in 2009. This makes the insurance industry one of the 
largest players in the financial markets.  In 2009, insurance companies 
controlled about 33% of total asset a decline from 37% in 1995. The US was 
the largest holder of assets under management in 2009 controlling 45% of 
assets, having recorded a decline of 3% since 1995 (IMF, 2011). The insurance 
industry in Kenya had gross premium income of KShs. 253 billion (US $ 2.53 
billion) in 2019 up from KShs. 215 billion (US $ 2.15 billion) in 2018 (IRA, 
2020).  The combined investment portfolios were worth KShs705 billion (US 
$ 7.05 billion). 
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 The investment governance of an investor is defined by the investment 
management decision making structure and the investment management style. 
It is the system of decision making and oversight used to invest funds. The 
focal point of the any governance arrangement must be the fund. It comprises 
of fiduciaries who include the board and management who are responsible for 
high level decisions (Governance organ) and implementation teams that may 
be internal or external experts (Hodgson et al. 2000). The OECD Pension 
Funds Governance Guidelines lay down two broad components of the 
investment governance of a pension, namely, governance structure and 
governance mechanisms, all of which are equally applicable to insurance 
company settings (OECD, 2009). The governance framework establishes the 
investment management style which is characterized by passive or active 
management approaches and the extent of delegation.  
 The ultimate objective of governance arrangements is to protect the 
interests of the beneficiaries of the fund. However, the benefactors or 
contributors of the capital are also desirous of ensuring the funds contributed 
are invested prudently. In the case of an insurance company, the contributors 
of funds are also the beneficiaries. The shareholders of the companies have a 
residue interest in the operations of the company. The fiduciaries are the 
management board supported by the executive who may then use internal or 
external investment managers to invest the policy holder funds. Figure I 
highlights the generalized governance framework for an insurance firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I: Generalized Investment Governance Framework.  
Adapted from Hodgson et al. (2000) 
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 The insurance industry in Kenya comprises of 67 companies operating 
as general insurers, life insurers and reinsurers. In some cases, insurance 
holding companies control both life and general insurance subsidiaries 
following changes in the law to disallow composite insurance companies. 
There were thirty seven (37) general insurance companies, twenty five (25) 
life assurance companies and five (5) reinsurance companies registered to 
underwrite business in Kenya as at 31st December 2019. The industry had a 
combined asset portfolio of KShs. 705.8 billion (US $ 7.05 billion) 
representing about 7% of Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (IRA, 2020). The 
governance arrangements around these assets are diverse and unregulated 
meaning that specific firm decisions determine the arrangements that are in 
place.  
 Delegated investment management exists where the investor uses an 
external manager to make investment decisions and implement them (Leung, 
2015). Delegated investment management may take two forms: centralized or 
decentralized. An investor can decide to use a single manager to execute her 
investment management strategy. This constitutes centralization. 
Alternatively, different managers can be retained to oversee different asset 
class strategies. This constitutes decentralization (Leung, 2015). The 
managers selected for a delegated investment management structure can be 
generalists (balanced strategists) who have skill sets covering all the major 
asset classes and can therefore manage diversified portfolios. Specialist 
managers on the other hand, handle only certain asset classes and usually will 
not manage diversified portfolios.  
 Investment management delegation structures can also be 
distinguished in terms of how client funds are handled. In this case, we have 
two alternative arrangements: mutual funds and segregated funds also known 
as Separately Managed Accounts (SMAs). The two arrangements are similar 
in that both products are managed by professional money managers. They are 
however different in terms of the ownership of the underlying securities in the 
portfolio. In a mutual fund structure, the securities are owned by the fund 
which is managed as a single portfolio and its shares are in turn held by the 
investors. In SMAs, the investor owns the underlying securities in his or her 
own account and accounts are managed on a client-by-client basis (Peterson, 
Iachini & Lam, 2011). In this study, a firm using any form of delegation to 
manage more than half of its assets is considered to be using the delegated 
investment management structure. 
 In Kenya investment management delegation is a common practice 
albeit not fully entrenched. This is because there is no regulatory requirement 
for firms to outsource their investment management activities. Being a crucial 
part of the investment governance structures, many firms have opted to set up 
captive fund management entities to which their investment assets are 
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delegated. This form of internal delegation has been observed to have some 
pitfalls such as override of decisional independence of the fund manager by 
the insurance client due to their shareholding control (M’Ariba, 2018). 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 Investment governance is an emerging area of focus for most 
institutional investors. Drew and Walk (2019) contend that investment 
governance is an enabler of stewardship that is expected of fiduciaries out to 
fulfill a duty to their principal. Investment governance relevance to insurance 
companies is amplified by the weight of assets that these entities control and 
their effects on the entire financial system. Increasingly, financial stewards are 
being held to a high standard of behavior by stakeholders and regulators. This 
makes investment governance a matter of great interest to industry 
practitioners, regulators and academia.  
 Globally, insurance companies rely heavily on their investment 
portfolios to meet their promises to policyholders. As such, Insurance 
companies are large investors in the financial markets all over the world 
(Schich, 2009). They intermediate more than 25% of global assets under 
management (IMF, 2011). Therefore, the investment governance 
arrangements put in place by an insurance firm have implications for the 
policyholders and residually the shareholders of the company. As an 
unregulated activity in Kenya, investment management by insurance company 
as well as the governance arrangements around are at the discretion of the 
company. Companies have a variety of governance arrangements around their 
portfolio management operations. 
 A number of studies have explored the issue of investment governance 
from different stand points. Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen (2008) studied the 
institutional investment delegation problem with a centralized Chief 
Investment Officer (CIO) and delegated management and concluded that 
uncertainty on risk appetite of delegated managers increases the costs of 
delegation. Useem and Mitchell (2000) study of US public and local 
authorities’ retirement schemes reported that governance policies impacted 
investment decision and strategies. Coronado, Engen and Knight (2003) 
comparative study of the effects of governance structures of public and private 
pension schemes found that public schemes were prone to some political 
interference that sometimes led to a return sacrifice. There is little or no 
empirical output covering investment governance of insurance companies and 
more particularly their delegation considerations.  
 Investment governance of an investor has two components: 
governance structure and governance mechanisms. It is unwieldy to attempt 
to study all the elements together.  This study focuses on governance structures 
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and specifically addresses antecedents of delegation and expert advice 
acquisition.  
 
Objectives of the Study 
This study aims to address the following objectives: 
 
General Objective 
To explore investment governance structures of insurance companies in 
Kenya. 
 
Specific Objectives 
The following are the specific objectives of the study: 
1. To ascertain the effect of corporate governance on delegation choices 
of insurance companies in Kenya. 
2. To evaluate the significance of market dynamics on delegation choices 
of insurance companies in Kenya. 
 
Research Hypothesis 
HO1: Corporate governance considerations do not affect delegation choices of 
insurance companies in Kenya. 
HO2: Market dynamics do not affect delegation choices of insurance 
companies in Kenya. 
 
Scope of the Study 
 The research was confined to the Kenyan geographical area. The 
research universe comprised of forty six (46) insurance and reinsurance 
companies operating in Kenya. The sample was restricted to licensed firms 
that were in operation in 2017. According to IRA (2018), as at 31st December 
2017, there were twenty (20) composite insurers underwriting both general 
and life business, seventeen (17) companies were underwriting only general 
insurance business, six (6) companies were in life assurance business only 
while three (3) companies were composite reinsurance companies.  
 
Theoretical and Empirical Review 
Agency Theory: Broken Agency  
 Golec (1992) characterizes the investor-investment manager 
relationship as one in which the investor (principal) hires an investment 
manager (agent) to offer investment management services. The services 
contracted for include information search, portfolio construction, trading and 
portfolio maintenance, all of which are unobservable in the portfolio return 
(output). Clark and Monk (2012) explain that, in institutional investment 
management, broken agency arises as a result of misalignment of interests due 
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to inappropriate distribution of risks and expected returns between the investor 
(principal) and the investment manager (agent). The consequences of broken 
agency according to Clark and Monk (2012) include distortion of portfolio 
construction (asset allocation) and inappropriate performance measurement 
and benchmarking. The broken agency problem manifests on the investor in 
terms of poor investment performance and higher costs of management which 
are investment efficiency effects. These effects observable to external parties 
leading peer validation and emergence of avoidance of regret which are market 
based dynamics. 
 Spitzeck and Hansen (2010) argue that the objective of corporate 
governance has been traditionally conceptualized based on the agency theory 
as the maximization of shareholder value. While corporate governance is 
concerned mostly with how organizations are directed and controlled, this 
study is interested in isolating the effect that corporate governance 
arrangements have on decisions regarding the investment governance 
structures. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) conceptualization of large shareholder 
monitoring over management is based on agency theory. Similarly, board 
control and avoidance of agency costs are drawn directly from the theory.  
 Investment management delegation necessarily creates a chain of 
principals and agents. Hodgson et al. (2000) illustrates that for most funds, 
there are many principal - agent relationships. The providers of funds delegate 
management to a fiduciary who in turn appoints a professional investment 
manager to invest the assets. Therefore, the first principal is the provider of 
funds, and the fiduciary (trustee/executive) is the agent. The fiduciary, acting 
as new principal then acquires the professional services of an investment 
manager who is the agent. The beneficiaries of the investment funds may be 
the same as the providers of the funds or not. Clark and Monk (2012) contend 
that in institutional investment management, agency theory and particularly, 
broken agency, may explain the shift towards in-house investment 
management structure as investors seek to align risk and return through in-
house teams of professionals.  
 The choice between internal and delegated investment management is 
mostly on agency problems considerations. Outsourcing involves the 
engagement of an agent to perform a task on behalf of the principal. In house 
management is motivated by avoidance of agency relationships and associated 
costs. On the whole, agency theory offers strong explanatory power in the 
conceptualization of this study.  
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Conceptual Framework 
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Figure II: Conceptual Framework. 
  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) contend that the management of a firm 
needs constant monitoring through persuasion and guidance. This monitoring 
role is played by the large shareholder. Large shareholders are a common 
occurrence in the Kenyan insurance sector. The main large shareholders are 
large multinational financial services groups, families and family holding 
companies and institutional investors like pension funds, investment 
companies and private equity funds. The nature of the large shareholder is 
likely to have an effect on key policy decisions. Shareholders control from 
multinational groups manifests in terms of deployment of international 
operational practices and group norms. Families reign their influence by 
taking strategic board positions to oversee management while institutional 
investors will often monitor management through professional and analyst 
pressure. This study considers five main large shareholder categories: local 
individuals, local holding company, family business, foreign multinationals, 
and state owned companies.  
 Boards of directors play significant monitoring roles with regards to 
firm performance (Wang, Jeng & Peng, 2007). The effectiveness of a board of 
directors in executing its control and advisory roles is partly dependent on its 
composition in terms of size, diversity and balance (AICD, 2016). This 
research sought to find out the extent which board size and diversity influences 
the extent of delegation by insurance companies in Kenya. Board diversity 
was measured by gender and skills set. 
 The principal agent model has been used to describe a wide array of 
specific situations of economic exchange. Some examples of these 
relationships and interactions in finance include shareholder-manager, issuer-
investment banker and investor-investment advisor (Golec, 1992). The 
principal agent relationships are often fraught by conflicts of interest that breed 
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principal agent problems or broken agency. According to Shah (2014), the 
presence of principal agent problems necessarily compounds the agency costs. 
In additional to the agent’s professional fees, the principal incurs some 
monitoring costs such as auditors and consultant fees. The fiduciary in an 
investment management arrangement, being an agent of the asset owners, may 
wish to avoid the costs and risks associated with delegating the delegated 
investment management authority. This avoidance of principal agent problem 
is likely to influence the use of delegation where fiduciaries choose to manage 
assets internally. Principal agent problems were evaluated by extent of 
prevalence of agency relationships in the business and reported cases of 
agency failure. 
 A market is a group of buyers and sellers of a particular good or 
service. The behavior of the buyers and sellers determine market outcomes 
(Mankiw, 2008). Market dynamics are the factors that influence the 
competitive structure of a market. The behavior of market participants is 
influenced and also influences the behavior of others. This study focuses on 
effect of three market dynamics indicators on the choice of investment 
management structure namely, access to alternative assets, peer group 
behavior “peer effects”, and asset allocation.  
 Clark and Monk (2012) argue that certain investment markets and 
products such as alternative assets are easier to access under certain investment 
management structures such as internal management. Market access refers to 
the ease of getting certain goods or services from particular markets. Some 
markets experience direct and indirect barriers that hinder users from 
accessing them. These barriers could exist as a result of the nature of the good 
or service, user classifications or the market organization. Urwin, Breban, 
Hodgson and Hunt (2001) posit that the role of alternative assets is to provide 
returns above equities and /or risks below equities. The three principal asset 
classes that provide this mix of attributes are private equity, hedge funds and 
real estate. The proportion of assets invested in alternative asset classes is 
related to the extent of delegation. 
 Gallagher, Gapes and Warren (2016) explain that under the co-
investment and partnership models of in-house asset management, small and 
medium sized portfolios are able to access and directly invest in large-ticket 
unlisted assets such as property or infrastructure by “piggy backing” on 
external management input. This enhanced market access from external input 
is also an overriding factor for investors who choose to delegate their portfolio 
management activities. External management allows both small and large 
funds enjoy benefits of enhanced markets access by using investment 
management with broad geographical and asset class reach or exposure. The 
asset allocation to alternative assets is used to measure the market access 
aspect of this research. 
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 Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman, and Yucht (2014) explain that people’s 
choices often look like the choices made by those around them: they try to 
"keep up with the Joneses”. Hodgson et al. (2000) argue that investment 
fiduciaries’ decisions are under the constant scrutiny and external validation 
by among others, the sponsors, beneficiaries, regulators and the wider public. 
These fiduciaries therefore take decisions that minimize regret and can be 
brand driven as well as peer group influenced. Cambridge associates (2016) 
explain peer group risk is a consideration investors are taking into account 
when choosing to delegate. Peer influence was measured qualitatively in terms 
of how investors feel compelled to take an action similar to their peers in the 
market. 
 Sharpe (1992) defines asset allocation as the distribution of an 
investment portfolio among a number of major asset classes. It involves the 
division of the investment choices into broad categories and choosing 
exposure that the portfolio should take in any one category. The ability to 
construct a tailor made portfolio demonstrates the asset allocation flexibility 
offered by internal management when compared to delegated management. 
Hodgson et al. (2000) argues that delegation choices have to be consistent with 
the asset allocation decision. The asset allocation decision is expressed in 
terms of the actual debt, equity, alternatives and cash mix as reported in firm 
records. 
 
Methodology 
 This study employed a descriptive research design. The target 
population consisted of the composite, life and general insurance and 
reinsurance companies licensed to offer services in Kenya by the Insurance 
Regulatory Authority (IRA) in 2017. There were a total of forty six (46) 
companies licensed to undertake insurance and reinsurance business in Kenya 
as at 31st December 2017 (IRA, 2018). Data collection took place between 
April and August 2019. Primary data was collected directly from the 
respondents using a self-administered questionnaire. The key respondent per 
firm was either the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) or the Chief Investment 
Officer (CIO). Secondary data was collected from regulatory filings. The 
study employed a binary logistic regression model represented as:   
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 [𝜋(𝐷𝐿)] = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐺 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐷 +  𝜀 
Where; 
Π (DL)  =  the probability of a firm choosing Delegation over 
internal management. 
CG  =  the market dynamic factors  
MD  =  the corporate governance factors 
β0  = the intercept representing the “baseline” event rate. 
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β1  = the odds ratio for corporate governance effect 
β2  = the odds ratio (coefficient) for the market dynamics 
effect 
ε0   = the error term  
 
Discussion of Results 
 It was not known a priori the extent of use of delegation in the 
management of portfolios by insurance companies. Therefore, primary data 
was collected to find out the extent of delegation by firms in the industry. It 
was found that 66% of respondent firms used internal investment management 
teams while 34% of the firms used the delegation approach. Having 
established that more firms relied on internal management as opposed to 
delegation, the researchers set out to find out the factors that led firms to 
delegation and away from internal management. The primary data collected 
for this purpose was on a five point Likert scale to establish the influence that 
the conceptualized factors influenced the delegation decision. The subjective 
responses were backed up with secondary data. Based on the Likelihood Ratio 
test (LR chi2 = 16.43, p = 0.0025) the model is well fitted and both corporate 
governance and market dynamics are important factors influencing delegation 
choices. Table I presents the results from the logistic model from STATA. 
  
 The logistic regression modelling relied on odds ratio analysis. 
Corporate governance indicators had an odds ratio of 1.2285 which implies 
that unit increase in corporate governance indicators increases the chances of 
a firm choosing delegation over in house management by 22.85%. This 
finding can be explained by the fact that as greater levels of corporate 
governance and surveillance are employed firms, are likely to move to 
delegating the management of their portfolios.  
Table I. Logistic Regression Model Results   
Logistic Regression.  
 
Number of obs  = 38  
 
   LR chi
2(2)       =  16.43  
Log Likelihood = -16.1955  Prob > Chi
2       =   0.0025 
 
   Pseudo R
2       =   0.3366  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          A1 | Odds Ratio    Std. Err.     z P>|z|      [95% Conf. Int.] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
      
Corporate 
Governance 1.2285 0.6605 0.100 0.017 0.2303 3.7437 
 
      
 
      
Market Dynamics 1.0500 4.8923 2.230 0.026 0.9240 9.5168 
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 The nature of the majority shareholder was noted to have moderate to 
high extent of influence on investment management structure decisions. Sixty 
percent of the respondent firms were privately owned and controlled by 
individual investors or locally incorporated holding companies. By their 
nature, private entities enjoy heavy patronage of the owners who control 
almost all critical decisions. Most individual investors in the Kenyan insurance 
sector have a strong professional background in insurance operations. As such 
they lack the requisite expertise in investment management. As a consequence, 
these individual investors have the inclination to outsource the management 
of their pool of funds to professional investment management firms. This 
partly explains the positive odds of firms delegating investment management 
over internal management. 
 The composition of a firm’s board was found to have small to moderate 
extent of influence on investment management structure decisions. The 
respondent firms had average board size of eight members with an average of 
one female director. The majority of the directors were also professionals in 
strategic management (average of five) and insurance operations (average of 
two). The nature of board composition suggests the lack of expertise in finance 
and investment management further reinforcing the tendency to outsource 
investment management decisions. 
 The need to avoid agency problems was found to be have moderate to 
great extent of influence on investment management structure choice 
decisions. Most firms reported to be outsourcing legal services (53%) and 
investment management (24%). The main agency problems encountered were 
communication and reporting (44%), fees and costs (33%) and monitoring of 
the agents (33%). Based on these observations, it would be imperative that the 
need to avoid agency costs supports internal management. As an individual 
factor, it exerts a negative pull against delegation. 
 To ascertain the efficacy of the model findings, the null hypothesis that 
corporate governance considerations do not affect delegation choices of 
insurance companies in Kenya was tested. The Wald test statistic for this null 
hypothesis was 5.01 and p> χ2 = 0.017. Based on the Wald statistic decision 
rule, at the 5% level of significance the null hypothesis was rejected because 
p> χ2 < 0.05 and concluded that corporate governance factors significantly 
affect the delegation choices of insurance companies in Kenya.  
 Market dynamics had an odds ratio of 1.050. This means that a one 
unit increase in market dynamics factors increases the odds of a firm choosing 
delegation over in house management by 5.0%.  This means that while market 
dynamics is an important antecedent of investment governance structure 
choice, it is less powerful when it is compared to corporate governance 
considerations.  
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 In this analysis, market dynamics was operationalized by three sub 
variables namely, the need for greater access to alternative asset classes, peer 
group behavior and asset allocation effects. Access to alternative asset classes 
was observed to have a small to moderate extent of influence on decisions on 
investment management structure. It was also observed that ninety percent 
(90%) of the respondents had invested in real estate as the main alternative 
asset class, forty percent (40%) was accessing private equity investments 
while twenty (20%) had invested in offshore investment assets. It can be safely 
concluded that real estate assets were an easy to access asset class among 
insurance companies in Kenya and was the main alternative asset class 
investment for most companies. No firms had invested in commodities, 
currencies and related derivatives. It is evident that alternative asset classes 
are easily accessing in the Kenyan market space and therefore is not a great 
influence for firms to delegate their portfolio management activities. 
 The behavior of peers was found to have a moderate extent of influence 
on delegation decisions. The interaction of board members and senior 
management with industry peers was considered as offering the best avenue 
for learning and observing the behavior of others. Ninety five (95%) of 
respondent firm’s board members and senior management had access to peers 
through membership in two main industry associations namely the Insurance 
Institute of Kenya and Association of Kenya Insurers. This means that 
interaction of companies’ management at high level association meetings 
offered opportunities to learn the behavior of peers which was likely to alter 
the behavior of individual firms towards the herd. 
 Asset allocation had a great extent of influence on firm’s decisions on 
investment management structures. The respondents’ asset allocation was 
heavily skewed to debt with an allocation of fifty eight percent (58%) of total 
assets and property investments that accounted for an average of thirty percent 
(30%). The clustering of investments in debt was a result of the reliable supply 
of high yielding government and corporate debt in the Kenyan investment 
market space. The regulations by IRA also require at least 25% of insurance 
companies’ portfolios to be invested in government securities as a mechanism 
of policy holders’ funds protection since these securities are secure from credit 
default. 
 The null hypothesis that market dynamics do not influence firms’ 
delegation choices was tested. The Wald test statistic for this null hypothesis 
was 4.96 and p> χ2 = 0.026. Based on the Wald statistic decision rule, at the 
5% level of significance the null hypothesis was rejected since p> χ2 < 0.05 
leading to the conclusion that market dynamics significantly affect the 
delegation choices of insurance companies in Kenya. 
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Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Investment governance structures are the bedrock of investment 
management stewardship and fiduciary duty. Insurance companies in Kenya 
use two main approaches to investment management. Internal management is 
more prevalent with sixty six percent (66%) of the industry’s firms managing 
their portfolios either through internal board investment committees, 
management investment committees or professional investment staff. 
Delegated investment management is used by thirty four percent (34%) of the 
firms in the industry.  
 The investment governance structure of insurance firms is not 
regulated by the insurance regulator. Therefore each firm has discretion in the 
choice of how oversees the management of its assets and more so how it 
accesses external expertise and advise. Based on this study, corporate 
governance and market dynamics are statistically significant antecedents of 
firms’ delegation choices. On corporate governance, it was found that large 
shareholders and family business owners sometimes dictate the delegation 
choices by requiring their firms to outsource their portfolio management to 
specific external experts. In other instances, the composition of the board 
increases the overall investment oversight amid lack of board skills thereby 
leading firms to delegate their portfolio management. On the other hand, the 
need to avoid agency problems leads firms towards internal management.  
 Market dynamics are an important factor in the delegation decision. To 
access alternative assets, sometimes firms turn to delegating their investment 
management activities. However, in Kenya, it is relatively easy to access 
alternative assets even with internal management and therefore access to 
alternative assets in not a great influence towards delegation. There are 
significant interactions among industry peers that sometimes lead firms to herd 
together. Therefore, peer group behavior exerts an influence for firms to 
internally manage their portfolio in line with the herd. The asset allocation of 
insurance firms is heavily skewed to assets that do not require high levels of 
skills to manage and are easily available. Asset allocation considerations 
therefore lead firm to manage assets internally. On the whole market dynamics 
are important but the extent of pull is more towards internal management as 
opposed to external delegation. 
 The findings from this study lead to the conclusion that the delegation 
choices of insurance firms in Kenya are greatly influenced by corporate 
governance considerations and to a lesser extent, market dynamics. Large 
shareholder control and lack of investment skills in boards leads firms to 
delegate portfolios. Easy access to investment markets and alternative assets 
amid constant supply of high yielding bonds as well peer influences lead firms 
towards managing assets internally.   
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 Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended firms should 
carefully evaluate their unique circumstances and market environment in 
designing their investment governance structures. Delegation structures 
should be preferred to internal management in cases where boards lack the 
robustness of skills as would be required to provide oversight in an internal 
investment management set up. Furthermore, due regard should be given to 
the market environment to avoid creating structures that do not yield 
incremental gains to the firm. 
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